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European Integration and British Skepticism

Out of the ashes of history, Europe has risen from the austere nationalism of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and from the horrors of the twentieth century to forge
new ground as an increasingly integrated continent. Gone are the once fervent attempts
at hegemony and domination, which have been almost completely replaced by a call for
vastly cooperative efforts. However, contrary to the considerable progress of the
continent, which will come to a head with the agreement on the common currency by
twelve of the fifteen European Union members Britain has remained a stubborn partner.
What has proven to be one of the most ambitious economic projects in history, the use of
the euro in all transactions in the twelve member states, will be a milestone for the “ever
closer union.” However, in Britain it simply serves as the gateway to deeper doubts
about European integration, doubts determined by key historical, economic and political
factors recognized by both political elite and the British public. Very strong attitudes of
national identity and sovereignty have developed from Britain’s history of world
influence, along with a more recent political trend towards the superiority of neoliberal
policy, a trend that strongly opposes the European model in many respects. These
attitudes are manifest in the form of widespread media and public opinion opposing the
initiatives, thus further perpetuating British diffidence as a whole. Therefore, there is an
important distinction to be made between Britain and the continent that can help to better
explain the British reluctance to assume a more solidified role in the European Union. If
1
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one looks at specific conditions that exist in Britain, it is evident that there are many
obstacles causing such a contentious view of the continent.
As the smoke cleared from the devastation of World War II, the leaders of
Europe, namely France in new cooperation with Germany, began to undertake a process
of rebuilding that proved to offer the first stepping stones for a continent-wide union that
after its fifth decade has made seemingly irrevocable progress. And, the individual
nation-states that dominated the European landscape since the Peace of Westphalia, 1648,
now believe that the benefits are substantial in “pooling” more of their sovereignty into
the increasingly supranational entities of the European Union and Economic and
Monetary Union.' It is this economic integration that appears to be the driving force
behind the European Union, but it has instead served as a pragmatic, visible assessment
of Europe’s progress towards more political cohesion. By many accounts, the European
Union and its institutional predecessors have largely had an economic scope in practice,
but a political scope in theory. While the original alliance following the Second World
War, the European Coal and Steel Community, afforded France and Benelux the
opportunity to prosper from rich German coal and steel reserves, it also kept the large
German war machine under watchful eye. Therefore, the process leading up to the
common currency has taken a dual role of economic and political unionization. Even as
the agreement has evolved into EMU, it has never been a secret that political
harmonization has been the goal of European leaders, using EMU pillar of Maastricht as
a benchmark from which to begin common defense, judicial and home affairs. The
founding father of the European Union, Jean Monnet, held the view that the ultimate end

' Pond, Elizabeth. 1998. The Rebirth ofEurope. (Washington, DC: Brooking Institute) p4
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should be ever deepening political union. And, Helmut Kohl, the former German
chancellor and one of integration’s most outspoken proponents, believed that the
consensus among his colleagues was a “United States of Europe.”
Whether or not this can be interpreted as the desire for a European federation, it is
no less disconcerting to Britain. It is this call for further integration, and the reaching of
the EMU benchmark that has Britain playing the role of the antagonist in the European
arena. While current Prime Minister Tony Blair has acted upon his commitments to
facilitate less hostile relations with the continent, namely by enacting the Social Clause of
the Maastricht into British law and using decidedly warmer rhetoric with European
leaders, he has preceded with noticeable caution on the issue. One of his first displays of
this caution came shortly after his Labour Party’s landslide victory in the 1997
parliamentary elections. Ostensibly, Blair imposed five economic tests to determine
Britain’s fitness for joining the euro. Below the surface, however, these tests were
imposed to silence the debate on the issue for the duration of the parliament.^ It appears
that while Blair has pledged to end fifty years of half-hearted ambivalence towards
Europe, it remains a reality that even if certain economic tests are passed, there are
deeper reservations for Britain concerning Europe.
British apprehension over further pooling of sovereignty and the abandonment of
British policy models also continues despite Tony Blair’s commitment to put Britain in
the driver’s seat of the European Union. Early in 2001, French Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin stated that while so many of Europe Union’s efforts have concentrated on
developing the single market, it was now time to focus on building a more “social
^ Quoted in the Report from the Federal Republic of Germany, November 27, 1990
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Europe.” This would put closer links between labor unions and employers, increasing the
obligation for European business to inform and consult employees. To British firms this
was a red flag warning that Europe has plans to infringe more and more on an employer’s
ability to manage, and the Confederation of British Industry pronounced itself “deeply
disappointed” at this intrusion on business’ rights.'* Blair sought to reconcile this at the
2000 Lisbon conference, calling for more flexible labor markets in Europe. He believed
that this could perhaps be the first step in helping Britain direct the initiatives of the
union. However, Blair soon found himself, along with the British model itself, as an
outsider with the other fourteen members forming a majority against the proposal.^ Thus,
despite the Prime Minister’s best efforts to ameliorate many years of tension between
Britain and the rest of the European Union, especially following the Conservative wildly
anti-European Conservative parliaments. He does so seeking to inject British style
politics into the continent. However, if the 2000 summit in Nice was any indication of
the future to come, Blair will find that this will not be easy without concessions that he or
other leaders in Britain are reluctant to make. Blair exhibited concern over the future of
Qualified Majority Voting, as the six founder members of the European Union had the
weight of their votes increased from 48 percent to 51 percent. Even though Britain
signed up for a “flexibility” clause, which allows some governments to move ahead with
integration so long as the core issues (like the single market) remain intact, there is still
the possibility for a strong majority to move on issues that could be damaging to Britain.^
It is this exact effort that lies at the heart of British angst towards integration. There are
^ “Maybe say the money men.” The Economist (US). June 9, 2001 ;p3
“ Ibid
^ Ibid
® Baker, David. 2001. “Britain and Europe; The Argument Continues.” Parliamentary Affairs. 54:p287
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simply too many deeply embedded factors in Britain’s history and political methodology
to foster strong Europhilia in both the elite and public spheres.
Former United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, provided one of the most
telling cormnentaries of the uncertain role of Britain in modem Europe and the world,
which greatly contrasts the influence and power that it held historically. He remarked
that Britain’s dilemma lies in the fact that it has lost an empire without assuming, or even
defining, its new role.’ In the past Britain held power as the leader of the Industrial
Revolution and as the center of an empire on which the sun never set. However,
memories of the empire have faded and Britain has had to reconcile its influence as only
the fifth largest economy in the world.
Therefore, while it geographically sits isolated from the continent, Britain has a
deeply entrenched and peculiar sense of national identity that arises largely from
historical factors. Throughout its history at the helm of world political and economic
power a distinct national identity emerged, one that weighs heavily in the minds of
citizens, the media and political elites. Unlike the leading nations on the continent,
namely the Franco-German alliance, Britain has burdened the cost of two world wars
without any recent experiences of defeat or occupation. National identity and simple
historical consideration puts British skepticism of Europe in perspective. For at least the
past three hundred years, Britain has held a firm foreign policy commitment to the
suppression of any one dominant European power. Whether it has been alliances in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to contain France or balance of power diplomacy

’ Rachman, Gideon. 1998. “Britain’s European Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly. v21, n3: pl75
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with Germany, Britain has either through war or policy largely achieved this goal.
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However, it is these two nations and the close relationship that they share within the
European Union that has put British elites on guard. They believe an increasingly
supranational body that is steered in large part by a Franco-German alliance that contends
with Britain’s attempts to lead Europe in a direction that parallels its own much closer.
This direction has been developed by confidence in its national identity that
measures liberty and concepts of “Britishness” in the symbolic form of parliamentary
sovereignty.^ This confidence is a sentiment that differs greatly from the diffidence held
on the continent, which appeared more prevalent in the nascent years of the European
Community but has nonetheless perpetuated the importance of the union from the
continent’s worldview. The question of sovereignty is one of the most hostile disputes
that Britain has concerning further involvement in the European Union. The “pooling” of
sovereignty that has been championed by so many European leaders throughout is more
often viewed as a zero sum game in terms of British sovereignty. And, many of the
strategic decisions made and attitudes held were developed “by events that occurred
largely during the period of Britain’s unrivalled power in the global political economy.”'”
With this notion of parliamentary sovereignty, further European integration
carries consequences that many view as compromising to British policy and economic
preferences. Moreover, Europe as a political and economic entity is not afforded the
same legitimacy in relation to the established British institutions." There remain strong
cleavages within Britain’s political climate that have already left the Conservative Party
* Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl75
® Baker, David. 2001 :p277
Baker, David and David Seawright, Eds. 1998. “Introduction.” Britain for and Against Europe. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press):p3
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in shambles after the 1997 elections, with Europhiles and Euroskeptics battling over
whether the European Union will be able to preserve a liberal ideology. Aside from this,
there is a wide majority on both sides of the spectrum that nonetheless regard the British
model as superior.'^
This belief in the preeminence of British preferences has been the stance of many
previous parliaments. The traditional lines of debate over Europe seemed to be drawn
between Labour and Conservatives, but even the New Labour and Blair’s Third Way
have proven to harbor Euroskepticism. While the sovereignty issue has been the primary
cause of severe cleavages in the Conservative party, Europe has also traditionally held the
power to create fault lines in the Labour party as it fluctuates between desire and disdain
for increased relations.'^ Labour has tried to forge a new European leadership role for
Britain, with many in the Europhile camp believing it an opportunity to mesh the best of
Britain with the continent. However, even the pro-Europeans realize that many aspects
of the political economy in Britain conflict greatly with the direction. Blair has embraced
Thatcherite policy and sought to transplant it to the continent—such as a push for labor
market flexibility and the easing of regulations on hiring and firing practices, which is a
dissenting option from the German corporate model that seems to be shaping policy in
the union.
This too is evident on the economic policy side of the argument, an important one
considering the critical emphasis placed on the success of the euro by the EU. Again, the
framework of British economic policy has little in common with “social Europe,” with

" Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl75
Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl77
Baker, David and David Seawright, Eds. 1998:p5
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widespread belief that it more closely mimics the ffee-market, loosely regulated
capitalism of the United States.''* Even the Labour government has shown little
willingness to move to the model of increasing social welfare at the cost of higher
taxation. Thus, the simple core issue remains that there is much to be done by way of
breaking strong ties to a neoliberal policy. While there is a general consensus that
crosses party lines over the superiority of a more open British-style neoliberalism, there is
also the consideration under this model Britain’s economy has done relatively well
compared to the continent. In fact, in the mid-1990s it grew at a rate faster then those in
either France, whose economy Britain has recently closed in on to become the fourth
largest in the world, and Germany, whose economy is viewed as the casting mold for the
European Central Bank. Lower levels of taxation on businesses leave them free to
prosper, a factor that proved to be cmcial throughout the 1990s when British firms
attracted about 40 percent of foreign investments in Europe. More over, the more liberal
tendencies of the British economy, the relative ease with which employers can hire and
fire have kept Britain’s unemployment hovering around 5 percent, which is less than half
of Germany’s 11.5 percent and France’s 12.1 percent.'^
These are issues that still weigh heavy on Tony Blair’s mind as he ponders
Britain’s next steps concerning Europe. On the eve of the Asia-Europe summit in Seoul
Blair emphasized his position that choices concerning the euro were strictly based on
national economic interests and the protection of them rather than simply using monetary
union to expedite political integration. He eluded to Britain’s interests when he said,
“Investors see us as leading the way in putting economic reform at the center of the
‘'‘Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl76
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European agenda, helping to build a strong Europe based on open markets, competition
and economic reform; a superpower not a super-state.”'^
It is true that Blair would rather transform the European Union more in the favor
of Britain, and many Europhiles believe the only way to do this is through full inclusion
in the proceedings. However, Blair’s “five economic tests” exhibit his hesitation in
making concrete decisions, knowing that these will delay such choices perhaps
indefinitely. This is the current parliament taking the empirical consequences of
Euroskeptics into consideration. At the present, Britain can set its own interest rates to
suit its own economic conditions, which despite recent growth are still problematic. In
order to suit these conditions, Britain now has interest rates that hover around twice the
German rates, thus heightening the risk of inflation. However, the European Central
Bank adheres to strict inflation restrictions and in economic and monetary union interest
rates converge to figures that could be dangerous to Britain.’^ Therefore, regardless of
the attachment to a more free market brand of capitalism there is also the possibility for
economic downturn should Britain choose entrance into the common currency.
Regardless of the attachment to a more free market brand of capitalism there also exists
the possibility for economic downturn should Britain choose entrance into the common
currency.
British skepticism over the European Union and further integration is not limited
to elite opinions. The public in Britain often tends to view integration as a zero sum
game, with more involvement with the continent spelling damage to sovereignty and

Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl76
quoted in Baker, David. 2001:p283
Rachman, Gideon. 1998:pl77
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national interest. Recent Eurobarometer polls have shown that British public support for
European Union initiatives is well below the European average.*^ Over the last decade, it
has varied from “lukewarm to positively hostile,” generally holding at 10 percent below
public support among other member nations.’^ While governments have tried to foster
better relations with the continent, they have for the most part seemed reticent to
challenge public opinion, viewing populace backlash as a dangerous slippery slope. Even
the most pro-European leaders have been aware of public skepticism, something that will
only continue with election-conscious officials such as Tony Blair in office. This will
also continue if the 1999 European elections were any indication to the ambitious Labour
government, which only received 28 percent of the vote. European opponents formed a
coalition of anti-European voters and used the election as a referendum on continued EU
membership, which seemed to strengthen Euroskeptics and weaken supporters.

20

Moreover, the Labour party seems hesitant to deter such negative rhetoric because it
would appear as a full backing of the continent, risking further public backlash.
However, even if the government did decide to change its position, or at least lean
a little more aggressively towards Britain in Europe, it would have to compete with a
much more vocal lot of opponents than it might be willing or able to deal with. This is
due in large part to a large Euroskeptic sentiment in the media. This contingency of the
media has kept pressure on the government over the preservation of the pound, the
dangers of Europe’s bureaucratic and undemocratic web, and it has in some cases chosen
to attack the Franco-German core of Europe.^' One consolation for European supporters

Eurobarometer 55, Spring 2001
Baker, David. 2001:p278
Baker, David. 2001;p279
Baker, David. 2001:p278
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seems to be the fact that more quality and credible news sources, such as the Financial
Times, Guardian and Observer have a decidedly more continent friendly spin. However,

relative to the Euroskeptic press these sources do not have nearly the readership, helping
to continue the tide of public distrust and doubt over the European Union. Despite the
tide of the media however, we will see that the public holds very deep-seated hostility
towards European integration. This translates into hesitancy in the leadership, which also
poses a problem in terms of leadership competency. Therefore, to an ambitious
Europhile such as Blair, public opinion becomes a double-edged sword. If he is to take a
hard line enjoining the continent in more initiatives, he runs the risk of the public
viewing him as careless with British national interests. On the other hand, he could meet
the same fate as the Conservatives of the last decade. If he is to falter in forming a
coherent, unified attitude on European issues, he then compromises confidence in his
leadership ability.
When considering these key factors, it is not hard to imagine why Britain still
views Europe from the perspective of foreign policy rather than as a domestic issue. The
European question already has many answers in the form of British domestic policy,
national identity and public sentiment. And as the continent continues to grow more
integrated, especially through the use of ambitious and uncertain economic projects like
the euro, the public and elite become more hesitant to submerge Britain in such
initiatives. A very delicate notion of Britishness and national identity, which largely rests
in the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, hampers their full commitment to the union.
Whereas many on the continent are beginning to view sovereignty as a multi-layered
stmcture, held by both national and European leaders, the British hold on to the enduring
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belief that sovereignty is indivisible?^ This identity is shaped duly by Britain’s memories
of global influence and imperial triumph and by the loss of this position without really
regaining a definite role. This runs as deep as the belief in the superiority of British
models of economics and politics that conflict greatly with those utilized by the EU.
Britain has always held the peace and stability of the continent in its best interests.
However, now that it does not consider this from the same position that it did in the past,
the European Union seems a dangerous alternative. Europhiles would suggest that the
union is the best opportunity for the continent to achieve success and lasting peace.
Euroskeptics see otherwise in much the same doubt and pessimism that has plagued
British governments and public opinion for the past five decades. The continent has
never been given the benefit of the doubt in Britain, being viewed as a very real threat to
British interests. Moreover, even in periods at which the support for further integration
within the union has seemed at its highest, Britain has remained unconvinced about the
losses and gains involved. And even with a Labour government that is eager to end fifty
years of half-hearted ambivalence, the answers come between a rock and a hard place.
At the first sign of any concessions made to Europe or concurrently, of any weakness
towards the continent, Blair and Europhiles alike will find themselves even more under
attack from an array of opposition groups and the public.^^ In Britain, all of the perceived
benefits that can come from a strong European Union have always been matched by the
very real possibility of equally detrimental drawbacks.

Baker, David and David Seawright, Eds:p8
Baker, David. 2001:p285

Literature Review

In order to examine the question of Britain’s relative ambivalence and hostility
towards European integration, we can first look towards past considerations of
integration. The primary precursor for any integration across national boundaries,
whether it be political or economic or both in the case of the European Union, is a careful
cost-benefit analysis on the national level. However, in the interest of the questions
presented in this paper, it is beneficial to look at the factors included in these cost-benefit
analyses and on what level they occur. For Mathieu Deflem and Fred C. Pampel,
international unification with special attention to Europe creates an unprecedented
challenge for citizens and scholars, meaning elite and coalition attitudes are taken into
mind along with public support. Both of these groups have to first make sense of
integration efforts amongst nation-states that were geographically, economically and
politically similar but nonetheless independent.' For Britain, this is especially pertinent
considering its long held traditions as a politically and economically strong state, an
attitude that has fostered a nonabrasive yet deeply entrenched nationalist sentiment.

2

This is to say, that nations first assess the extent to which engaging in international
integration affects certain aspects of sovereignty, which has the potential to conflict with
any possible gains from forming a union.
' Deflem, Mathieu and Fred C. Pampel. 1996. “The Myth of Postnational Identity; Popular Support for
European Integration.” Social Forces. v75 nl:pl 19
^ Ibid:p\23
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Some authors have chosen to look at the broader motivations and impacts of
international integration by exploring factors outside of the political or economic realms.
To this extent, national identity and other cultural explanations have been given for a
nation’s decision on whether or not to engage in any sort of integration. Stephen
Shulman has given national identity and nationalist sentiments the dual role of either
being a positive or negative determinant in the decision. In Shulman’s case, nationalism
refers to the “collective self-determination” of a nation in the effort to reduce extra
national influence and allow for autonomous control over its own destiny.'
This means that any sort of nationalist tendency confronts a complex set of factors, and
according to Shulman this does not necessarily discredit the merits of joining into an
international union. By using case studies of nationalists in Quebec, India and the
Ukraine he argues that nationalism has the possibility of even encouraging international
integration.^ The incentive for international integration is more apt to come from
involvement with foreign countries that are close in historical and cultural ties, which
would alleviate some of the pressures of foreign influence. In the three cases Shulman
found that advancing the core goals of autonomy, unity and identity actually encouraged
nationalists to support international integration, pushing for policies of free trade, foreign
investment and globalization.
This is perhaps explained by an assumption made by James Mayall who states
that the idea of closing off the state for fear of influence from other nations or from the
supranational level is similar to the liberal ideal of completely free and open ties across
' Shulman, Stephen. 2000. “Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration.” International
Studies Quarterly. 44:p369
^ Ibid:p366
^ Ibid:p3S6
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borders. Shulman furthers this point by also citing Leonard Tivey’s belief that
protectionists and liberal market proponents both have the well-being of the state in mind,
but that they both choose to disagree on tactics."^ In rapid globalization the preservation of
identity and autonomy is often manifested through economic clout in the world, and thus
the paradox in Shulman’s cases arises. However, some have referred to the “psychic
income” involved, by which the satisfaction of autonomy neutralizes any monetary loss.
Thus, the cultural diffusion brought on by the influence of actors outside the nation-state
can perhaps become a larger cost than desired, thereby placing high priority on the
deterrence of this pressure.^
However, regardless of the perceived and empirical effects that international
integration will have on efforts to strengthen national identity, culture and prestige in the
world, the fact is that nationalism plays a significant role in the motivations of political
actors. The influence of a core culture and identity remain a major consideration when
weighing the benefits and costs of opening a nation-state to an international union.
Matters of political and economic importance have strong historical roots in the idea of
the nation-state as a constmction of unique historical traditions and events that inevitably
shape an autonomous identity. According to Deflem and Pampel, the conception of the
nation-state as the primary actor in the international system has roots in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, and that even the present conditions of globalization and
interdependence have failed to significantly alter this.^

James Mayall and Leonard Tivey both cited in Shulman, Stephen. 2000.
^ Shulman, Stephen. 2000:p369
® Deflem, Mathieu and Fred C. Pampel. 1996:pl20
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Agreeing with Antonio Menendez-Alarcon, a prominent author on Spanish
national identity in the face of European integration, Deflem and Pampel also believe
that this persistence of the nation-state as also fostered the persistence of national identity
as a basis upon which countries favor or disfavor supranational participation^ To show
this, they conducted a study across thirteen European Union nations that sought to
explain support for integration while controlling for factors such as sociodemographic
and ideological composition of the countries. Their results found that support for
European unification was stronger among groups such as white-collar workers and
citizens with higher degrees of education. However, they also found that country
differences in support proved stronger than did any sociodemographic variables,
confirming that the social composition of countries does not play a significant role in
affecting support.* They did the same for ideological factors such as support for a
nation’s system of government, and found that this type of support is closely related to
the conception of national identity. The democratic deficit that exists in Brussels has
provided confusion and concern over the sources of authority across borders. Therefore,
the answers to politically relevant questions are still sought from familiar identities of
authority and legitimacy that are held by national and regional actors. However, Deflem
and Pampel noticed that these ideological considerations still do not sufficiently dictate
support for unification based on the assumptions made by authors like Shulman.
Countries may still favor integration, but do so under the auspices of strengthening their
own identity. Thus, we can see that European unification still has little to do with
establishing a “postnational” ethos that will associate citizens under a larger umbrella.
'' Ibid.^\2\
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Rather, the support of a particular nation has more to do with ideas of a national ethos
uniting with others. As we will see later, with authors like Christopher Anderson, issues
taken into consideration by public opinion are shaped within the framework of national
issues. Therefore, the idea of the nation-state over a postnational regime is perpetuated,
and integration relies more on a plurality of particular national identities.^
When we find that the concept of identity and association still falls under the
framework of the nation-state model, we can also extend this idea to political and
economic preferences when exploring what factors affect a nation’s willingness to
integrate with other nations. This is to say that preferences for one particular model of
policymaking seem to be as deeply embedded as those pertaining to national identity.
Whereas countries will choose to integrate with those that hold similar cultural and
historical backgrounds, it is also true that a major restructuring of political and economic
systems seems too much of a strain as well.
For Christoph Knill, the very sfructure of the European Union seems to allow
such preferences to be voiced, and thus making individual national policy the very
building blocks of such unification. The existing traditions that nations practice are
increasingly embedded in core rather than peripheral issues, and the degree to which they
are rooted in ideological “paradigms” is increasing as well.'” The fact that much of the
significant policy decisions for the EU are made in the Council of Ministers, the
dependence on the cooperation of member states is becoming a major shaping factor for
the union. Knill believes that this increasing reliance on national officials has increased
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the influence of national traditions and preferences, and is potentially divisive
considering how much they might differ from country to country.' ^ Therefore, the
willingness of nations to accommodate for integration is also widely correlated to the
ability for administrative reform in a specific country.
Rnill starts from the assumption that if nations are to participate in this adaptation
to supranationalist alliances, they do so following the “logic of appropriateness,” which is
to say that these adaptations are assessed with consideration to existing mles and
procedures.'^ States are much more willing to act within the “logic of appropriateness”
in the sense that engaging in international integration would simply be a change within
institutional traditions rather than a change o/these traditions. Any threat to the stability
of the institutional base is likely to provoke intense opposition. Furthermore, the ability
to engage in this reform depends largely on the number of institutional veto points that
political actors can utilize in policy decisions. The amount of these veto points is
affected by the political system, such as party system, centralization and the access that
non-govemmental actors have to the system. This is also based on the legal and formal
procedures that are required to enact reform, and therefore the process is open to debate
and participation where available so as to deter swift, single-handed changes “from
above.”'^ Knill goes on to designate three degrees of adaptation pressure, which is to say
the tension created between proposed and necessary reforms for integration and already
well established institutional paradigms. A country with high adaptive pressure is one in
which integration policies would strongly oppose core preferences, and the strongly
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embedded core could not adapt easily, if at all, to exogenous influences. Moderate
pressure exists in a country in which reforms would have to be made within traditions but
not of these core elements, while low pressure would indicate some preexisting harmony
with integration policy.
To be sure of his hypotheses about eore institutional structures determining
participation in integration, Knill looks at the implementation of European environmental
policy. Surprisingly, Knill found Germany (the leader in Emopean unification efforts) to
be the least compliant with EU policy “fi-om above.” Only with the Environmental
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) could adaptation and implementation be
observed. According to Knill, the explanation for the rejection of other EU policy lies in
Germany’s tradition of Rechsstaat, which involves a deeply rooted legalism and a
superior role for the state. Therefore, any policies that sought to alter this tradition were
viewed as having a delegitimizing effect on the state, and did not fall within the “logic of
appropriateness.” Furthermore, Germany’s acceptance of the EMAS also had basis in
tradition: that of Germany’s corporatist scheme. Since the EMAS sought to establish
independent organizations as the verifiers for industrial environmental management, it fit
in well with the German tradition of using intermediary organizations to perform these
sorts of checks.'^
To further the influence of national traditions on international integration, James
I. Walsh also chooses to utilize a domestic politics approach. This contends the idea
diffusion theory of integration, which believes national policies to converge on each other
with one country proposing the model with which all other integrating countries would
Ibid-.pS
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conform. Many have determined Germany to be this leading country in European
integration, especially in economic areas. However, Walsh believes idea diffusion to
have less of an effect on a country’s willingness to integrate than do domestic trends.'^
Walsh’s discussion focuses on national preferences in monetary integration, but he states
that these preferences have wider implications as to the shared commitment of sovereign
nations to unite.

He looks at the establishment of monetary policy and the underlying

stracture of monetary integration in Europe over the course of the last three decades in
order to show that this was not so much a convergence as it was a battle of national
policy models.
Throughout economic and monetary union, Germany has held steadfastly to what
Walsh deems a technocratic program, which favors establishing stmctural conditions to
keep inflation low and to allow for a central bank that was outside the influence of
political pressure. However, Walsh states that the French and Italian preferences
reflected a more politicized model, which allowed for active fiscal policies and would
call for political institutions to coordinate and control these, preferences which came
largely from the economic conditions in both countries at the time. Therefore these
conflicting national preferences hampered the formation of new monetary institutions
until the early 1990s and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which came about due to
falling inflation in France and Italy and a greater ability to shift towards the German
technocratic model.** Until the conditions begin to converge and allow for smoother
integration, a tension will remain in the process if the trends of the respective countries
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differ along significant lines. For example, the high inflation countries in this case did
not want to tighten policy that would curb inflation but sacrifice growth and employment.
In the same light, Germany’s low inflation preference would conflict with any loosening
of monetary policy that would drive prices higher. Therefore, a country of a certain
economic condition would want the other state(s) with which it is integrating to bear the
burden of coordinating policy.'^ We could expect then that any substantial difference in
the policy models already in place in a particular nation are another key factor in
determining its willingness to engage in international integration.
There is literature that also suggests that the attitudes and trends of the elite and
political institutions are not the only factors affecting participation in international
integration. In fact, some would say that electoral politics perhaps makes public opinion
an even better litmus test for integration. We have seen that integration proceedings are
often determined in the meetings of national representatives in the efforts to both voice
and protect specific national concerns. Furthermore, we could then expect public opinion
and key voters to have a significant impact on the attitudes of these national
representatives, considering their political legitimacy is granted by the electoral process.

20

Following the logic of the aforementioned importance of domestic politics, Matthew
Gabel believes that European elections, that is those in which EU citizens elect members
to the European Parliament, are simply second-order elections that largely reflect public
opinion on domestic issues. The importance of public support for integration is thus
heightened by the very nature of these elections. If these elections simply are secondIbid\'p65
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order, then they would in fact serve as important indicators or markers to national
•
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officials and voters thus sway the focus and dynamics of later national elections.

Gabel found that the degree to which public opinion influences national officials
is not only obviously related to the time until the next domestic elections, but also to the
relative distance between European and domestic elections. Using the European
elections as markers, elected officials will pay significant mind to the results of European
elections. Christopher Anderson looks at the extent to which citizens will transfer
attitudes concerning European integration to support for domestic issues and actors. Both
Gabel and Anderson both write under the assumption that public opinion on integration
issues does not follow traditional party lines to the extent that it does within the national
context. Furthermore, we have seen public opinion causing severe party cleavage in the
case of Britain’s Conservative Party, which would follow the theses that the public uses
European elections and referenda as outlets for protesting certain policies, and that they
also use national issues as proxies for wider integration questions.
Therefore, Anderson believes that European publics have the ability to stall or
halt any unification efforts regardless of support for the current government in the sense
that there is no traditional party separation.^^ Anderson also uses the aforementioned
argument that the very nature of decision making bodies at the supranational level keeps
further integration efforts in the context of domestic opinions. Opinion among the public
in the respective nations is a crucial ingredient in the process because it imposes
constraints upon the national representatives in the process. Previous research has sought
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to show public opinion waxing and waning in relation to the business cycle or broader
cost-benefit analyses in the event of economic integration. However, Anderson suggests
that the public does not look to such broad outcomes of integration, instead forming
attitudes based upon domestic issues that serve as proxies for larger integration
questions.^^ Anderson looked at public satisfaction at the domestic level in relation to
support for integration efforts in Europe, in hopes of drawing a larger consensus about
what sways public opinion. Expecting the intergovernmental nature of the European
power structure to allow for a positive relationship between support for the domestic
government and wider European institutions, he found the contrary. In results that seem
more along the lines of the aforementioned research, Anderson found no relation between
support for domestic government and satisfaction with wider continental initiatives.^'*
Therefore, not only does public opinion affect a nation’s foreign policy in the
sense that it constrains officials, it does so with special consideration to the domestic
political context. Furthermore, the domestic context is a crucial consideration across the
public and elite spheres, even going as broad as national identity. This is to say that
international integration is perhaps based on different factors than previously believed. It
is true that countries engage in cost-benefit analyses when deciding to form some sort of
supranational unification; however, they seem to do so fi'om the bottom up. Countries act
within a “logic of appropriateness” that looks deeper than simple monetary wealth and
administrative efficiency. This is due to the fact that this logic is determined by attitudes
that run deeper than these superficial considerations and that span the political elite and
the public. Thus, any challenge of core domestic attitudes and beliefs, whether it be a
“ Ibid:p572
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threat to sovereignty or to administrative power structures, will be one of the primary
deterrents to a nation’s willingness to participate in international unification.

Ibid:p5S2

British National Identity: No Need for Europe

National identity is perhaps one of the most widely overlooked factors used to
assess both the domestic and international proceedings of a particular state. This is not to
say that it has no bearing on the means and outcomes because it is a deeply embedded
factor that involves tradition and the basis for ideologies. However, it is this deep
embeddedness that perhaps makes the idea of national identity such a latent variable. Its
effects may be taken for granted as preferences that tend to surface in other, more
practical terms such as the establishment of a welfare state or rooting on English football.
In the past, the idea of “Britain” and “Britishness” seemed to be regarded in much the
same way. The stigma of moral superiority and dignity, of regal elegance and London
chic attached itself to these ideas, but the fact is that it remained unconsidered in a sort of
casual humbleness that also seems to pervade cool Britannia. In other words, many saw
it and felt it, but it was often alluded to in vague, proud claims such as Cecil Rhodes’
declaration that to be British was “to have won first prize in the lottery of life.”’
However, towards the end of 2000, the Labour government no longer seemed
content with this, continuing a recent trend that has pushed national introspection to the
forefront of discourse. For the Labour government this was manifest in Prime Minister
Tony Blair’s special assignment for MP Michael Wills, in which he was asked to
encourage all members of parliament to pay respect to British national identity in
' Quoted in “Nation-Gazing: British Greats.” The Economist (US). October 28, 2000

25

26

speeches and in policy decisions.' This was probably no change in standard procedure
for Conservatives, who have had a long history of protecting national identity and
sovereignty above much else. However, with the recent devolution of some power to
both a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly, the prime minister certainly must now
define what is meant by national identity. Should, therefore, Mr. Blair pepper his
speeches before Parliament or other European leaders with sentiments towards the
northeast and Sedgefield? Certainly the prime minister would forego such rhetoric in
favor of a more unifying identity of the United Kingdom, or at least a greater Britain.
However, this is precisely the identity crisis that now seems to grip the UK, and one that
has been rapidly assimilated into the debates arising from further European integration.
The notion of British national identity, which along cultural and historical lines
gives birth to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, has always been in conflict with the
process of European unification, mainly at the hands of the Tory governments that have
ruled Parliament for much of the European community’s existence. Currently, however,
even the Labour Party cannot seem to shake considerations of national identity, in spite
of their verbal claims to end British ambivalence towards Europe. Thus, it was a similar
case for Prime Minister Thatcher as well as Labour governments, in that Britain’s “head
is in Europe but its heart is elsewhere.” What this seems to suggest is that because the
concept of Britishness is so deeply rooted, an identity crisis would also mean deeply
embedded confusion. This is a confusion that runs deeper than Dean Acheson’s remark
that Britain has lost an empire without finding a new role in the world. While this
' Hattersley, Roy. “Definitions of a National Identity; Tony Blair Wants Our Nationality to be Celebrated.
But What is It?” The Guardian. November 13, 2000
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particular aspect of the identity crisis does play a major role in Britain’s relations in the
international sphere, especially in Brussels, it is not the only tension to arise over identity
in recent decades. While the debate was seemingly triggered by the loss of empire (and
subsequent loss of global influence) and by the encroachment of European integration, it
-5

has also been further fueled by the recent devolution of power to Scotland and Wales.
Britain first wants to use its national identity to define itself within the global network of
power and influence, and then in the context of Europe. It uses this national identity to
define a framework for British interests in order to protect them from supranational
pressure. During an era of imperialism, Britain was easily able to define itself under the
Crown. However, as the United Kingdom slowly begins to see with devolution the
reemergence of four nations (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) in one, it
has also found that what was once thought of as “British” could more aptly be
characterized as a hegemonic Englishness. With this said, the assertion of Scottish or
Welsh sentiments might seem to transfer to a federal agreement with Europe. However,
what history has told both about the empire and more so the British Isles is that regardless
of Englishness being synonymous with Britishness, the goal of Westminster has always
been to keep Britain together and strong. Thus, even in an increasingly diverse Britain
with a more European friendly Labour government, we could be witness to the nascent
reassertion of this Englishness as Britishness in an attempt to reassert Britain in the
world.
In the past, any considerations of British national identity have always had the
undertone of a British exceptionalism in relation to the rest of the world, including
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continental Europe. This has both been borne from a history of imperial global influence
and the longevity of British sovereignty and democracy. It is without a doubt deeply
ideological, evoking images of the Magna Carta, parliamentary traditions and
sovereignty, and simple references to its geography as an island that stands alone.'* With
traditions and the past in mind, both political elite and citizens have found it difficult to
confront the growing interdependence of a world in which Britain is no longer the leading
influence of political, economic or social power. This difficulty also arises when Britain
uses 700 years of political freedom to shape an identity when trying to work within an
historically “unfree” Europe.^ This is especially tme of past Conservative governments,
which have tried to conjure deeply rooted imagery. In a speech before the House of
Commons in May 1990, Prime Minister Thatcher when she referred to a national identity
and “ancient traditions and heritage” based in liberty, law and sovereignty, “which have
done so much for the world.”^ This seems to suggest that despite decades of muddling
through without a definite role on the international stage, Britons still believe that their
historical exceptionalism is relevant. Even as German industrial strength began to
dominate and centralize the continent around this power, the sense of “Splendid
Isolation” became even more concerned the moral authority and free institutions of the
Anglo-Saxon people. As the German power engulfed Europe and then became entangled
in a game of checks and balances in the European Coal and Steel Community after
defeat, smug feelings of separation from the continent were reinforced in Britain.’
Therefore, while French and German national identities had been soiled by crushing
Wallace, William. 1991:p69
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defeats in the Second World War, Britain emerged victorious and unoccupied by foreign
powers, strengthening its assertions of special character.
This rise in sentiments of moral authority and military victory also corresponded
with a strong national identity connected to its status as a leading industrial power and its
advancements in technology, which both had been prevalent throughout history with the
Industrial Revolution occurring in Britain’s backyard. It was also home to the ports of
one of the strongest merchant navies, the target of heavy foreign and domestic investment
o

and still the bastion of liberalism. This, therefore, forged even further a long historical
attitude of superiority in the world, and further turned Britain’s heads towards the open
oceans and away from the continent.
However, while Britain’s eyes looked to reach out across the open seas that
surrounded it, the latter half of the twentieth century brought a deflated vigor and the sun
had finally set on the dismantled empire. While claims of democratic virtue still
underscore British attitudes, they do so with a weakened voice. The eeonomic, industrial
and imperial strength that once gave national identity a sturdy soapbox on which to stand
were one by one surpassed as global interdependence grew and the Commonwealth
shrank. In order to redefine the parameters in which Britain can operate in the word sans
the global influence of empire it has been forced to answer once unconsidered questions
of its “Europeaness” as well as of Britishness. These questions were supposed to be
answered when the Macmillan government made its initial application for membership in
the European Common Market in 1961. With the first application, what was supposed to
be a reassessment of Britain’s world and the birth of a new role in Europe was denied by
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France’s Charles de Gaulle because he felt that Britain was not sufficiently European.
This was perhaps a correct assessment considering that Britain had never until this point
thought of itself as significantly European. National sentiments about this were still
evident in the debates that surrounded the referenda on membership when Britain’s
application was finally accepted by the continent in the early 1970s. Also, following
membership, there was the rise of a new view on national identity alongside that of an
imperialist national. This was the ethnic nationalism championed by MP Enoch Powell,
which assessed Britishness along the lines of ethnicity and thus fervently opposed
European encroachment, among other immigration and citizenship issues.^ Although this
did not receive majority support in Parliament, it did force new issues in the
consideration of national identity and what threats Britain’s new role in Europe and
around the globe made against it.
The loss of empire undoubtedly left a scar on Britain’s national self-esteem, and
this would suggest that Acheson’s chide is carried into current national identity crisis as
an open wound. However, it also seems to have caused a rift in conceptions of national
identity, one of which is based upon traditional appeals to history, heritage and ethnicity,
and another that has tried to compensate for the rapidly internationalizing and multi
ethnic Britain.The former has been cultivated over the history of the United Kingdom,
in the sense that it bases Britishness in terms of English rule. This is to say that while the
UK is comprised of four distinct nations, it has been in the interest of those in power to
define Britain from the perspective of Westminster. However, what this does not imply
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is a desire for cultural hegemony. This has often been used as a national character along
which Britain has defined political terms and preferences, and therefore, it has been in the
best interest of this national identity to keep the United Kingdom together.
This type of national sentiment took root in the expansion of the union of the
English and Scottish Crowns in 1603, the Act of Union, linking the English and Scottish
parliaments in 1707, and with the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland in 1800. While this left intact notions of “Scottishness” and “Irishness,” given
that Gaellic-speaking Catholics came under the mle of English-speaking Protestants, it
did so alongside the rise of a new conception of Britishness. What this did was bring the
Celtic fringe under the umbrella of an English constitution and identity.

Therefore, the

United Kingdom was a multi-national entity, but the gains of the empire in the centuries
to follow served to unify Britain in the terms of England. This was an “imagined
community” based on the expansion of English nationalism, which bonded the UK
together with strong ties.'^ While “imagined community” was often assumed to be an
English identity rather than one of the united lands of the UK, it nonetheless did so under
the belief that the success through an empire and two world wars sparked a common
Britishness. Thus, Britishness demanded a pragmatic loyalty to the civic institutions that
the four nations shared and in Britain’s highly prized parliamentary sovereignty.'"^ The
people of the United Kingdom are bonded together under the civic commonality of
Parliament, and perhaps more importantly, the freedom of this institution has become
synonymous with the freedom of the British people. Therefore, it has been intolerable to
" Crick, Bernard. 1991. “The English and the 'Qritish." National Identities: The Constitution of the United
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have any sense of identity compromise this sovereignty; and, moreover, basing loyalties
on a cohesive English identity became key to insuring the sovereignty of Parliament.'^
A dual sense of identity emerged as the English cultural umbrella and civic
loyalty offered differing conceptions of Britishness. The English cultural umbrella, or
new right, seems more rooted in imperialism, with Britain projecting a moral authority
and superior traditions across the Commonwealth and the world. Civic identity however
was favored more by Labour because it emerged as the idea of rallying a diverse
populace behind a common sense of duty. Thus, a new crisis of identity has emerged
between new right and New Labour views of national identity. Both seem to lie in
historical considerations of unity under empire and in times of pressing foreign policy
issues, as well as from the United Kingdom’s composition of four distinct nations under
one body.'^ With this, the new right position, which was first articulated by Enoch
Powell, mimics the attitudes of Tories during the establishment of the unions of England
with Scotland and Ireland. This is to say that pre-political unity was deeply embedded in
British national identity based on the country’s history and geography. Therefore, it is
the belief of the new right position that British national identity has remained singular
and unattached to any larger entity. And, it is not simply because of geography that such
a sentiment has evolved from a faith put forth in British political institutions. This means
that the importance of parliamentary sovereignty has held as a central tenet to national
identity: first as a cohesive authority under which four nations imited, then as a sovereign
that concentrated the United Kingdom’s expansions abroad. Even with the fall of empire.
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this notion is till prevalent in British national sentiment, with more recent Conservative
leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and William Hague appealing to parliamentary
sovereignty. Moreover, as this view has had to reexamine the influence that Britain is
now to assume on the global stage, it has seemed to subsequently reassert the importance
of cultural cohesion.^^ In other words, a reemergence of Britain in the world would also
have to correspond with a reemergence of a unified character, which new Conservative
leaders have taken to mean the assimilation of cultural pluralism into a British way of
life. However, the Britishness that this proposal reflects follows an historical tendency to
mean and empathetically English sense of identity.

18

On the other side of the spectrum, this new right way of life would seem to come
into direct conflict with the more civic sense of national identity that the recent Labour
governments would like to assume. One of the largest efforts to put forth a more civic
identity has been the recent devolution of powers to a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh
Assembly. In the preface to the White Paper Scotland’s parliament. Prime Minister Blair
stressed that this has been a long awaited modernization of British politics by way of
opening government and freeing up more individual liberties based on more localized
representation.'^ Therefore, there has been an effort to redefine the terms of Britishness
along lines that seem more concerned with a simple common citizenship that would leave
traditional conceptions of English, Scottish or Welsh intact. However, one critique of
such a view is that New Labour has chosen an almost adamant anti-tradition attitude
towards national identity, perhaps giving too much consideration to the four nations in
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one theme of Britain.^® From an historical perspective, we can see that it has always
benefited British interests to form an overarching character that affords a concentrated,
united effort, especially during times of external pressure such as the two world wars. It
was no coincidence that the term “British” was more agreeable in a time of war, a time in
which Welsh, Scottish and English defended a common liberty. Therefore, it is perhaps
not an illogical conclusion that the United Kingdom can properly and assertively assume
a leadership role both around the world and on the continent.
It has been suggested that the new right perhaps has given too much merit to old
world imperial glory, making crass assumptions about the superiority of a decidedly
English identity. But, the emphatic denial of this tradition by the New Labour definition
will make it difficult to project any strong identity abroad. Some posited questions have
asked about the consequences of devolution by way of cleavages between decision
making bodies and their effects on identity. If, for example, a Scottish parliament is now
able to decide local issues, what will be the reaction if Westminster as a whole is able to
answer “English” questions.^’ This could possibly lead to a strong reassertion of
Englishness (most likely from the Conservative side) as the predominant indicator of
British identity if it sees this being diluted by the devolution of power. The goal of
institutions in the United Kingdom has always been to hold the state together in a
reflection of common ties that are singular, sovereign and derived from a moral authority,
which has often translated into a strong attachment to parliamentary sovereignty. This
has even been the goal of Labour governments and the press for national (i.e. British)
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welfare provisions and the relief of disparities.^^ Therefore, devolution and a move
towards an identity that is loosely based on mere citizenship have been designed to
modernize Britain to accommodate diversity. And, while this does by no means imply a
desire to compromise the unity of Britain, which is perhaps the last thing on the mind of
Tony Blair as he tries to built British credibility in Europe, it certainly has the
consequence of upsetting delicate sovereignty issues within the UK.
Britian’s national identity crisis would be less pronounced, if it would even an
issue at all, if concepts of national association simply referred to legal matters of
citizenship and civic institutions. However, the peculiar situation that Prime Minister
Blair and all of Britain now find themselves in is one in which exceptionalism exists on
more than one level. Beneath the moral authority that Britain established for itself as a
whole are the differing notions of Scottish, English, Irish, and Welsh.

And learning

from past consolidations of Britishness in pressing foreign policy matters (certainly
qualifying European integration) an attempt to patch any internal separations may
certainly be the next likely step after devolution.
From this, there is the possibility that national identity could negatively shape
future relations with the continent. This negative effect would come from the reassertion
of a more centralized, ethnically-charged identity in order to consolidate a collective
attitude towards Europe and elsewhere abroad. This has certainly been the trend over the
past 300 years, and it has since sought to suppress, in the sense that it wants to bring them
under one umbrella identity, any separatist notions of identity in the four nations.^'* If this
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is to be the case, this would allow the same psychological separations and hostilities that
were prevalent during the Empire and following the second World War to resurface,
especially in more Conservative-minded people. This would first bring obvious
cleavages like simple geographical separation as well as linguistic and cultural division to
the fore in the British considerations of Europe. With notions of identity being so deeply
rooted in history, it is important that a part of this history has included Britain paying
more costs with the blood of its own and receiving little benefit from the continent. To
Britain, the integration of Europe is the erasure of the sovereignty that it did pay so
highly for, which in turn would ignore these important historical factors.For Britain, a
consideration of history would deem that any separation from Europe is simply an added
sense of security.
If national identity is to assume this form, the most fundamental problem that
European integration poses is the threat to the parliamentary sovereignty. Because this
sovereignty is a byproduct of Britain’s unwritten constitution, the attachment to
Westminster as the one true sovereign entity is much more psychologically engrained for
the sake of posterity. Because of this unique nature of the British constitution and the
deeply embedded concept of parliamentary sovereignty, decisions by the Council of
Ministers or European law passed down by the European Court of Justice are not so
damaging to the sense of sovereignty in other European Union members.^^ If Whitehall
is forced to either conform future laws to fit European approval or if it has to repeal past
laws in an assimilation to EU law, it is constmed as an attack on sovereignty and as an
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attack on a crucial caveat of British national identity. And, British courts have not
typically served under the same terms of checks and balances as does the Supreme Court
in this country, but European Courts have said that not only its decisions but also those of
British courts applying European law can over-turn decisions from Westminster.^^
Therefore, the British courts are positioned to assume a role over Parliament in some
instances, and this is in large part the psychological problem that is presented to Britain
with the expansion of European influence within member borders.
This appeal to a more traditional sense of national identity is perhaps a testament
to the confusion and crisis of national sentiment that Britain is still wrestling with after
losing its status in the world. While on the surface, it might seem as though this
mentality is only embraced by xenophobic Conservatives, but it does appeal to the sense
of history that the New Labour definition ignores and could therefore be deemed as a
more substantive national identity. Tony Blair with his more civic approach to identity
might seem as though it is an attempt to modernize Britain and align its thinking to be
less hostile towards Europe. In this approach seems to reshape British national identity to
become a largely superficial celebration of the countries inventiveness in looking to the
future.^* However, what it seems to also do is court London chic rather than a united
historical or cultural element. To give Prime Minister Blair the benefit of the doubt, his
efforts to grant Scotland and Wales their own elected assemblies do come with the
possibility of winnowing away the forced assimilation into the more English sense of
identity that has marked past sentiments and tmly find a common identity. However, as
we have seen already, the past attempts to consolidate identity were simply put in place to
lbid-.^\9
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keep the United Kingdom together as a projection abroad, not an attempt at the
hegemony of one nation over the other three. It can also be granted to the New Labour
approach to national identity has a lot of ammunition to work with if it is to look to
British inventiveness in a sentimental manner. Britain recently passed France’s economy
for the first time in thirty years to become the second largest economy in Europe still
using a currency independent of the continent. More over, because of the long-awaited
prosperity the new vigor of Britain has been widely noticed.
However, it could be pointed out that this renewed vitality could call for a
reemergence of feelings of moral authority and the superiority of Britishness. It is
important that this approach to national identity chooses to look at characteristics such as
inventiveness and vitality in the modem world as indicators of a new, more civic minded
attitude because it inevitably affects attitudes of foreign relations. Tony Blair and his
New Labour attempt to use Britain’s prosperity as a display to the world, and more
importantly the European Union, that it has modernized its thinking and is willing to end
ambivalence and hostility towards the continent. It is perhaps a bit ironic, however, that
as these superficial appeals to prosperity make the advantages of joining a currently less
successful Europe the considerations of actual identity (based on historical and cultural
detail) tend to become more crucial to Britain’s European decisions.^^’ Therefore, this
standpoint seems self-defeating in actually reshaping British identity along lines that are
common and deeply seated. More over, the devolution of power is not the only way in
which separation of national sentiments is likely to occur in the United Kingdom. So far
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as this “modernized” approach tends to define British attitudes abroad, it also alienates
much of the country as well. In other words, much of the prosperity that has occurred in
Britain has come from London. Therefore, it is self-defeating in its efforts to show a
more benevolent feeling towards Europe in another way as well. New Labour would like
to shift national identity to cosmopolitan characteristics that exist within Ealing and East
Ham, Finchley and Brixton. This has further alienated those outside of London, where
they must bum their contaminated livestock and wait for “modernity” to assault traditions
such as fox hunting.^' This has the possibility to cause a divisive reassertion of
traditional associations in order to protect them, which as we know turn eyes away from
the continent.
Thus, while there is obvious contention with European encroachment in the more
traditional associations of national identity, there is also the underlying albeit real
possibility of internal separations in the more civic minded alignment. With separation
would come domestic tension that allows more nationalistic and more Euroskeptic
mentalities to arise. If this is to affect the foreign policy orientation of these nations it
will do so negatively in relation to Europe, both along historical lines of exceptionalism
and with respect to sovereignty and curbing any threat to it.
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Domestic Political Trends and Incompatibility with the EU

Examining the sense of national identity that is present in Britain provides us with
a general, abstracted framework that provides the origins of Britain’s incompatibility with
European integration. From this framework, we are given some idea of the half-century
of half-heartedness and ambivalence that Britain has shown towards the continent. Also,
it allows us to move from this more abstracted view into an exploration of how this
national identity has been transferred into Britain’s domestic political framework.
Primarily, we have seen that a sense of exceptionalism has been present in Britain
because of its former imperial status, and its sense of moral and social superiority,
especially in relation to the continent. Moreover, differing cultural and historical
experiences from those on the continent have historically turned British attention and
interest away from the continent and more towards its Atlantic alliance and a more open
seas policy in general. With regards to the domestic political institutions and attitudes,
this exceptionalism overtly displays itself in Britain’s growing neo-liberal trend, which is
in many ways directly at odds with the more “social” conception that European
integration is pursuing.
Before comparative consideration is given to the overall political and economic models
of Britain and Europe, we could anticipate such an incompatibility with consideration of
Westminster’s role as the sole law-making body in Britain. Therefore, sovereignty and
subsequently political legitimacy has traditionally been bestowed upon
40
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the Crown Parliament, making it difficult for a supranational authority such as Brussels to
affect smoothly its decision making in Britain. This incompatibility has been debated for
decades not only between the Conservatives and Labour, but also within them, which
recently has corresponded with a drastic weakening of the Tories. However, these
confrontations across the Commons floor and within party headquarters are not at the
root of British skepticism towards European Union initiatives. Both Euroskepticism and
Europhilia agree with the superiority of the British model, which inevitably leads the
arguments back to question of to what extent does the further European encroachment
pose a threat to British self-government and its ultimate survival as a nation-state. *
However, this is precisely where British skepticism over further European
integration takes root. The initial assumption that the British political and economic
models are still the most desirable for Britain to utilize will have obvious consequences
for parliamentary sovereignty and policy formulation. Recently, Prime Minister Tony
Blair and the Labour government have sought to rectify this by vowing to make Britain a
leader on the continent rather than playing the game of catch-up in which it has
frequently been engaged. To Blair this means turning eyes more towards Europe in an
effort to end the half-hearted ambivalence that was so prevalent under the Conservative
governments of the past, especially in the Thatcher and Major governments. However,
this might not be the easiest task for Blair. Both Margaret Thatcher and John Major came
to power at the beginning of their respective terms in office vowing the same assertion of
British values upon the continent, Thatcher even going so far as to fully support the
signing of the 1986 Single European Act. However, the question then arises of how such
' Rachman, Gideon. 1998. “Britain’s European Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly. v21 n3:pl75
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ambitious leaders were able to acquiesce into Europeanization only to then shift to
become some of the continent’s most adamant opponents.^
Britain’s first application for membership into the European Economic
Community (EEC) came as early as 1961 under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, so
while Britain has disputed the continent for several decades, it still has a reputation for
leaders trying to move towards the continent in order to shape it in the British image.
However, this seems to have been more a product of contemporary considerations and
less to do with a desire to conform to European standards, perhaps even going so far as to
be a preservation tool for British liberalism and parliamentary sovereignty. The
aforementioned contrast between the experiences of the continent and Britain during the
post-war period led Britain to adopt an important “special relationship” with the United
States.^ Losing this relationship, or at least seeing it weaken in the face of a further
integrating Europe is perhaps the primary reason for British application to join in the
integration efforts at all, fearing that if Europe became too successful it would surpass
Britain as the United State’s primary partner. Thus, the only way in which Britain could
preserve this Atlantic relationship and the “special relationship” was to join the EEC."*
However, the feelings on the continent at that point had developed from a perceived
failure of national governments and an obsolescence of the concept of nation-states.
Thus, when the continental nations began integration as what they felt to be a necessary
security measure, they also seemed aware of Britain’s deep-seated differences in the
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matter. Upon the first application, French President Charles de Gaulle announced a
resounding veto to British membership for reasons aptly hinting at characteristics that
would place tension between Europe and Britain even decades later. He claimed that
Britain was not European enough, and he even went so far as to mimic the claims made
by more conservative Britons, which claimed that Britain was an insular country bound
by “her trade, her markets, her suppliers, to countries that are very diverse and often very
far away.” Therefore, according to de Gaulle, how could Britain “as she lives, as she
produces, as she trades, be incorporated into the Common Market?”^
While this was early in Britain’s bid to become a member of the European
Community, with its eventual accession to membership at the beginning of 1973 and then
legitimized by a June 1975 referendum, it was perhaps a more accurate foreshadowing of
the relations between the Community and Britain. Macmillan’s concerns over the loss of
the special relationship with his cross-Atlantic ally was more a fear of losing a partner in
a more neo-liberal, capitalist club than could be afforded by the continent. Furthermore,
these same sentiments have followed Britain into later relations with the EU, particularly
those of Thatcher’s terms as Prime Minister. Whereas earlier British PMs wanted to
preserve Britain’s ties to a country more in tune with their own, Thatcher also wanted to
preserve parliamentary sovereignty by insulating Parliament’s ability to govern from
wider societal constraints by tying certain policy (namely economic) to the continent.^
This initial statecraft strategy was thought to free up certain concerns of the government
in an attempt to stabilize these policy concerns. However, what Thatcher and the
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Conservatives soon found were the problems that remained at the roots of British
policymaking, which became evident as her successor, John Major was eventually led to
drop out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and then opt-out of the common
currency caveat of the Maastricht Treaty. What these opt-outs and drop outs conferred
was that any attempt to sign up for the Maastricht Treaty’s dramatic step forward in
integration, meaning common currency, the Social Chapter, a common foreign policy and
more, was also the surrender of any future efforts at the more American-style policies to
which Britain is accustomed.^
Many would believe that Thatcher and Major (as well as current Tories) were
simply adopting chauvinistic tendencies towards British superiority. However, if this
were the case, then the recent Labour government, now in its second term, would be able
to easily erase all hostility with the continent. Tony Blair would like to have people
think that he is doing just that; and, he has in fact made an effort to turn at least one of
Britain’s eyes towards Europe, namely by adopting the Social Chapter of Maastricht.
However, for all of the rhetoric that Blair would like to adopt about conducting fnendlier
relations with the European Union, it is possible that he will soon encounter the same
obstacles that Thatcher began to encounter after coming to office as pro-European.^ With
the EU embarking on perhaps its most ambitious project to date, the euro, Britain has still
opted-out of this pillar of integration. Moreover, Blair himself seems to realize the
fundamental problems of policy harmonization with the continent, evidenced by his “wait
and see” attitude. On the surface, Blair seems to be avoiding the sensitive political issues
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involved in such harmonization. In an attempt to present a more economic approach to
the situation, Blair has presented five economic “tests” that are to he passed before
putting further integration questions such as the common currency to referendum.
However, when it comes down to assessing whether or not these criteria have been met, it
seems to be more a matter of judgement. Whether or not further economic integration
will be beneficial for employment, or investment, or other financial aspects in the end
amounts to a matter of judgement.'® In simple terms these would seem to extend
Britain’s foot forward on perhaps becoming a full, more cooperative member of the EU
by showing that it is in fact giving the idea serious thought. However, if the terms of
membership are still viewed as politically dubious, these matters of judgement can be
swayed just as quickly as they attempt to avoid the underlying questions of Britain’s
compatibility with the continent.
Prime Minister Blair might be trying to erase the atmosphere of tension that has
marked Britain’s relations with the continent, especially the Euroskepticism of his
Conservative predecessors. However, Europhilia and Euroskepticism are more attitudes
on how to approach further relations across the English Channel. It is beyond these
preliminary attitudes that even the most pro-European leaders are bound to run into the
underlying dissimilarities between British and European conditions and policy
preferences. This is especially true if we consider that Blair is trying to make Britain a
leader on the continent in an attempt to export the British model. More and more it
appears that Blair has perpetuated Thatcher-like preferences for labor flexibility and a
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more liberal agenda in general.'' Thus, regardless of how Blair spins future
considerations about joining in future European integration, there are underlying
differences that have and will continue to arise. If Blair continues to choose economic as
an indicator of British compatibility then he will see discrepancies between a “social”
Europe and Britain, especially in employment and growth which are two of the economic
tests. Once these considerations are combined with the traditional concerns over national
and parliamentary sovereignty, it becomes more apparent that domestic conditions direct
British awkward partnership with Europe.
As mentioned above, if Prime Minister Blair and other European proponents are
going to stmcture criteria for further integration around quasi-eeonomic tests, then some
feel that this approach will expose the difficult constraints that European policy will place
upon Britain.'^ Perhaps because of the “special relationship” that it developed with the
United States in the last half of the twentieth century, or because of the more “open seas”
policy adopted during its imperial days, Britain has developed an economic model that
differs in many important ways from the continent.
In a 1988 speech to the Trade Union Congress, then socialist President of the
European Commission expressed plans to develop a more “Soeial Europe” that could
guarantee better rights than could the individual member states.'^ Such claims to a more
socially based Europe referred to higher rates of public spending and also to practices
reflective of the corporatist German model that has seeped into European policy.
However, this fundamental economic stmcture on the continent seems to pose the
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greatest problems with Britain. Many, even some on the continent who are continuing de
Gaulle’s line of thinking, have adopted the contention that Britain’s economy mirrors a
more laissez-faire capitalism that is characterized by looser regulations and lower
taxation like the United States rather than the “social” Europe. According to Philip
Whyman et al., Britain’s economy has been found by empirical studies to react
differently than those of other economic monetary union (EMU) members 87 percent of
the time. Even more so, if the European Central Bank (ECB) is going to adopt policy
formulation based on Germany’s Bundesbank then it becomes an important factor that
Britain and Germany have only exhibited a 54 percent compatibility.''* As we saw
earlier, Britain first signed up for the EEC because of fears of falling behind the rest of
Europe and thus jeopordizing its relationship with America. However, now that Britain
has recently become Europe’s second largest economy, it currently seems to be doing so
well that even the Labour party has shown reluctance in the face of discrepancies
between the two models.'^
With these discrepancies, the problem of one centralized economic authority
ruling over disparate economic environments arises. This problem has been expressed as
a concern for the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries upon EU
expansion, but so too does it affect the decisions for Britain. Inside EMU, it is very likely
that countries will experience vastly asymmetrical shocks, making it difficult for a
centralized authority to react in a manner conducive to success in all countries. Again
using the example of Whyman et al., countries such as the United Kiingdom are largely
'^Hearl, Derek. 1994:p515
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sufficient in energy resources, whereas the majority of European countries are not. If, for
example, oil prices were to rise and benefit the UK but harm the majority of members,
then the ECB would be apt to correct the harm to the majority in a manner that is not
beneficial to Britain.*^ Moreover, as a result of a centralized European authority, member
countries are required to keep budget deficits within 3 percent of their GDP. For the
United Kingdom, past cycles have proven this to be difficult in times of an economic
downturn. In the past twenty years, Britain’s economy has gone from deficits as low as 8
percent to a surplus of 3 percent at certain times. What constituted an 8 percent variation
in the 1980s has recently risen close to 10 percent, meaning that the UK must ran at least
a 6 to 7.5 percent surplus if it is to stay within the 3 percent requirement in EMU, which
is double the surpluses it has had in the recent past.'^ Therefore, it is fundamental
disparities between Britain and the continent that could prove negatively beneficial in the
incongraent policies and limitations of a centralized authority.
Britain’s economy has recently grown at faster rates than those of both Germany
and France, and if leaders such as Blair are going to continue to embrace more loosely
regulated policies, then this seems to have afforded Britain certain advantages with
regards to some of the economic “tests.” Privatization and lower levels of taxation have
made it apparent that Britain is a far more liberal economy than the continent. As a result
of this, it has managed to become the target for approximately 40 percent of the foreign
direct investments coming into Europe, and overall it is the third most popular target in
the world.

This appeal has much to do with the relative freedom that businesses have in
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Britain’s more liberal model than in the more constrained corporate model of Germany.
This difference is especially prevalent in the hiring and firing freedoms that firms enjoy,
which contributes nicely to Britain’s concerns about employment and economic growth.
At around 5 percent, Britain’s unemployment rate is only half of those on the continent,
which total is near 20 million people and ranges from 11 to 12 percent in countries like
Germany and France.*^ Therefore, it is evident that the British economic model has
different market-oriented, neo-liberal goals from the austere anti-inflationary model that
the ECB has chosen to adopt. This was evident during their stint in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM), from which Britain chose to exit after unemployment hit double-digit
rates.^'^ Also, British interest rates tend to run close to double those in Europe because of
the increased risk of inflation. This would seem to dampen the hopes of even the most
heartened Europhile, who believes Britain must further EMU in order to shape it in its
own image. However, because Britain is reacting to its own economic conditions, its
rates would have little influence over the continent’s conditions as they converge.

•y 1

It carmot be doubted that the establishment of a common market of free trade and
mobility in Europe champions liberal economics to some extent. However, to what
extent is exactly where conflict with Britain comes into play. Many can cite the Common
Agriculture Policy (CAP), which compromises a large piece of the European Union’s
budget, as the apparent signs of continued “social” practices. In addition, there have also
been recent efforts to harmonize certain areas of welfare and taxation, including a
withholding tax on savings income. This initiative would seem to compromise the
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British trend of lower taxation by raising them to European levels, but tensions have been
eased to some extent after the EU held out on the harmonization. However, then British
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, commented that it was “not necessary nor
advisable to harmonize tax rates,” reflecting that his country is still choosing to hold on to
its commitment to lower taxation and is still aware of the pressure that harmonization
and European economic policy puts on a differing British system.

22

The harmonization debate on the EMU aspects of further integration seems to
reflect a larger contention that Britain has with the continent. From the nascent forms of
the European agreements up to the present stmcture of the European Union, an
increasingly federal decisionmaking scheme has arisen. One reason for this is the strong
leadership role that Germany has played throughout the history of integration. However,
when we consider the German federal structure, characterized by Lander governments
practicing “substantive harmonization of policies and highly developed procedural
uniformity,” we find that Britain holds a vastly differing power structure that is perhaps
at the root of its skepticism.^^ Therefore, the extent to which a federal government can
integrate into a larger federal system can simply be viewed as a further diffusion of
power. However, a unitary system marked by an ultimate authority vested in Parliament,
this integration is not only more difficult but also completely incompatible.
It has been no secret that the original core leadership of the European Economic
Community right up to the European Union has wanted an “ever closer” political union.
Jean Monnet, the father of the European Union, made it known that his ultimate goal was
“Britain and EU Tax: For Now the Sovereignty Battle is Won.” United Press International Bulletin.
November 27,2000
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a political union; and, in 1990, then Gennan Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, stated the great
goal of integration was a United States of Europe. However, while Kohl’s Christian
Democratic Party was trying to convince French officials to abandon the “empty shell” of
the nation-state, British skepticism grew.^"* Britain’s initial disenchantment with the more
consensual, bureaucratic administration of Brussels was the first sign that this conflicted
with traditional confi-ontational politics that is custom in Westminster. What Britain fears
is the distinct possibility that Parliament will have to cede its ultimate authority to
supranational authority. Alongside his colleagues, Jacques Delors has also suggested that
power eventually come from Brussels, predicting that well over three-quarters of social
legislation will come from a wider European authority in the future.
As early as 1994, the British ministry of trade and industry found one-third of all
British law originated fi-om the continent, which included three-quarters of the laws that
affected their businesses.

Such a consensual style of politics as is in the European

Union becomes a problem for Britain when directives become the result of a compromise
between fifteen (and perhaps soon to be twenty to twenty-five) members. Wildly
different domestic conditions affecting this consensual system present the problem of not
considering national interests to the extent of their importance. While this is a possible
concern for all member states in their “pooling of sovereignty,” it presents a more
troublesome situation for Britain. It does this by altering the traditional balance of power.
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usurping parliamentary sovereignty and the overall power structure in Britain’s more
unitary govemment.^^
Contrary to this unitary system, the European Union seems to suffer through a
confusion of powers. Many have expressed concern over the democratic deficit that
exists on the continent, considering that the only directly elected body, the European
Parliament, still carries little influence. Also, the Council of Ministers and the European
Commission now decide some issues that were traditionally within the scope of national
parliaments, especially in Britain. The Council of Ministers holds the role final approval
of legislation, while the Commission conducts policy initiation and elaboration.
Thus, the European Union has taken power away from Westminster without
providing a similarly elected authority in Bmssels. The traditional role of Parliament as
the highest sovereign power in Britain has never attempted to erode its attitudes of
accountability and elected legitimacy. However, now the democratic deficit extends even
deeper considering the secretive nature of these Council of Minister deliberations.
National parliaments in general remain largely uninformed about their proceedings
because of secrecy rules that do not permit even minutes from being recorded at these
meetings.

Therefore, Parliament rarely has the time or the means to formulate a

cohesive opposition to any policy it deems threatening to national interests or
sovereignty, compromising an important confrontational role to which MPs are
accustomed. Furthermore, a structure in which a group of indirectly elected memberstate representatives holds the legislative role damages the legitimacy of these national
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executives because they are not fully accountable for the initiatives that they must now
implement.

28

Recently, there has been a trend in Britain moving more of the power into the
hands of the executive, especially with Prime Minister Blair taking a hardline stance
against any dissention and thus controlling any majority in Parliament. Therefore, some
might be willing to say that the power that is granted to the Prime Minister and the
Ministers are already such that it would not be improper for this to extend to Brussels.
However, talks at the Nice 2000 Summit might have stirred up some concern that even a
more centralized power structure could not avoid encroachment from Europe. As many
important policy issues in Europe require a unanimous decision by member states, albeit
allowing countries such as Britain to exercise an opt-out, it might not be immediately
apparent that further integration would necessarily compromise national interest. If
current or future Ministers do not agree with legislation, they may simply use their veto
power. However, the Nice European Summit began talks aimed at making the EU
legislative process more efficient by way of extending Qualified Majority Voting to
policies on taxation and common foreign and defense matters. The fears for Britain then
become more pronounced as it would eventually have to cede sovereignty on these issues
by losing its power to reject and reshape them. Moreover, any sovereignty that is lost
could also pose threatening to national interests of Britain since the result of another
product of the Nice summit gave the six founding member states of the European
Community 51 percent of the vote in the Council ofMinisters.^^
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If such a formidable alliance is formed, it could pose huge problems for Britain’s
efforts to retain national sovereignty and stave off a federalist structure. Even now, as we
saw with the 1994 report by the trade and industry department, Britain has already been
inundated with European initiatives. It has also been forced to make some concessions to
another institution that has not held the same power in Britain that it does on the
continent, which is to say the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In an instance such as the
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into British law, we
have an opportunity to see the ways in which European initiatives have taken absolute
sovereignty away from Parliament by way of establishing a decidedly law-based
objective restricting legislative activity. In order to avoid certain concerns over the
complete erosion of parliamentary sovereignty, the Human Rights Act of 1998 does not
grant national courts the power to strike down primary legislation. However, with the
power to declare an incompatibility with the ECHR, courts have now applied pressure for
not just formal legislation but also all policies and executive actions to be “human rights
proofed.” Moving this advisory authority from a more detached role on the continent
into the national courts will force Parliament to play a more cautious role when ensuring
that laws comply. It is the primary reaction that the ECHR sets off is another structural
stress point that Britain holds with wider European institutions because it serves to bring
the courts into the political arena.^'^
Thus, it is this further erosion of parliamentary sovereignty that lies at the heart of
British concerns that its national balance of power and tradition are being attacked from
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several angles. From the amount of European legislation that has already made its way
into the British system we can further conclude that the ECJ has assumed an oversight
role that has either directly interceded with British law or has placed psychological
constraints on lawmakers and the executive. It is in this situation that Europe seems to be
adhering more to an American model by allowing its highest court to exercise a supreme
court authority. Thus, the important distinction that has yet to be rectified by Britain is

the decidedly legal nature of European integration. The idea of “subsidiarity,” whereby
the European Union grants decisionmaking power to the member states in areas in which
it is deemed more suitable in doing so (i.e. more country specific matters), was
incorporated into the Maastricht agreement, it was done so under dubious terms
aecording to British leaders. Whereas this distinction of proper authorities would seem to
clear up any fears over excessive European encroachment, it makes the claim to doing so
without drawing tangible boundaries between the two jurisdictions.^*
It is important to introduce this point about subsidiarity because it also uncovers
Europe’s hesitation about granting too much local authority back to the member states.
This is the precise function of the ECJ about which Britain may have the most to fear.
The ECJ has already set a precedent by taking an interpretive stance on decisions, stating
that the member nations had already agreed to a new legal system in their joining the
Union.^^ By doing this, it has already overturned the British Merehant Shipping Act of
1988

on the grounds that it violated provisions granting the freedom of services. Also,

the Court has also sided with the Commission in areas concerning the British veto of
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legislation. The working time directive sought to establish a maximum workweek of 48
hours for all EU employees in a manner that was highly controversial to British leaders in
the sense that it tried to ignore British opposition by attaching it as a rider to legislation
that would only require a qualified majority vote.^"* In situations such as this British
leaders have struggled to retain influence over further integration by way of preventing
qualified majority voting from seeping into the broader issues, the common market being
one. However, when Britain took the Commission to court over this attempt to
circumvent its authority, the ECJ still ruled in favor of the Commission.
Therefore, for as long as terms such as subsidiarity carry ambiguity and for as
long as the ECJ is able to increase its checking power on Parliament, the more Britain has
to worry over. National courts continue to receive more power from the continent to act
independently and even over Parliament to the point that Westminster has seen its
autonomy diminished. And, the extent that the European stmcture has tried to replace the
traditional concepts of legitimacy and autonomy has not been able to rectify British
concerns. While other member states might be under the protection of specific
constitutional provisions to ensure rights, Britain does not carry such safeguards except
under the authority of Westminster. When this safeguard is compromised by higher
institutional enforcement or judicial review, then this system becomes threatened. The
secretive and undemocratic practices of the European hierarchy is dangerous ground that
leaders in Britain are fearful of treading. It is perhaps an incorrect assumption that the
confusion of powers in Europe can be legitimized in any way under parliamentary
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sovereignty. But also, it may even be incorrect to assume that Britain can exist within a
European system that serves to damage the legitimacy of Parliament and the traditional
sources of power.

Public Opposition to Europe: A Double-Edged Sword

From the standpoint that the hierarchical unitary system of Britain offers a
structural incompatibility with a quasi-federal Europe also offers insight into the problem
of public opinion for British leaders. With the efforts of the current Labour government
to diffuse power to elected assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there
have been mentions of the abilities for participation that this affords subnational groups.'
However, we have seen that in the face of pressing foreign relations questions, there
tends to be a consolidated effort by the British government by way of reasserting the
absolute authority of Westminster. This alongside the recent strengthening of the
executive within Parliament presents a situation in which devolution is certainly
occurring but is nonetheless still secondary to an overall unitary structure.
With this said, the role of public opinion in Britain assumes a crucial role for
further British involvement with Europe, both as a result of integration issues and as a
determinant. The subnational actors have been granted steps towards further
participation in British governance, but this is still very much in the nascent stages. With
unions and similar organizations less entrenched in the political process and with the
British political style differing from the more corporatist model of core European leaders
such as Germany, channels of participation are thus limited. However, the limited
channels in Britain also presuppose a larger impact of the voter in both referenda and
' See Bomberg, Elizabeth and John Peterson. 1998. “European Union Decision Making: the Role of Sub
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elections. The degree to which Prime Minister Blair has resorted to American-style
“spin” and rhetoric is far from an academic testament to this, but it has been obvious
enough for London theater to pick up on. All satirical jabbing aside however, public
opinion in relation to an array of issues, a large contingency being European, “has
brought an element of imcertainty to British electoral politics.”' The degree to which it
ousted a disjointed Conservative government, no matter how closely its Euroscepticism
mirrored the public’s own, has even the European-enthusiast Blair walking the tightrope
of Europe.
This is largely seen in Blair’s willingness to extend an open-hand to his
colleagues on the continent alongside an inability to fully sell further British cooperation
domestically.^ Blair has focused on overall stmctural issues in the European Union, such
as flexibility and extended qualified voting, but he has largely tried to make headway by
imposing economic tests with concern to joining the euro. As we have seen however, the
Prime Minister nonetheless encounters overarching political questions in doing so, and
thus becomes more at the mercy of the British public. In other words, by creating the
paradox between proposing seemingly tangible criteria that can only be satisfied in
subjective terms, he has expressed an important concern: the hesitancy of British leaders
to reach beyond their elected grasp, even with the largest of parliamentary majorities.
Fueled by a Eurosceptical press that has in recent history experienced European
opposition with Thatcher and Major, the public has voiced its own opposition, which
could be compounded by any sort of hesitation in the leadership. Past and current polls
' Evans, Geoffery. 1998. “Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a
Liability.” British Journal ofPolitical Science. v28:p573
^ Stephens, Philip. 2001. “The Blair Government and Europe.” The Political Quarterly. v72 nl :p67
^ Stephens, Philip. 2001:p67
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show lethargic support for the common currency and the benefits of membership in the
European Union as a whole. While the leadership elite in Britain has always tended to be
more opposed to more threatening questions of Europe as a superstate, the public has
seemed to remain adamant in their hostility towards Europe in any respect.
Eurobarometer polls have always shown the British public support to fall about 10
percent short of any other member-state."* Therefore, the wavering of even pro-European
leaders has been cognizant of such opposition, and therefore had its arguments stifled.
Therefore, public opinion becomes a double-edged sword. As the Tories discovered in
the 1980s and early 1990s, an inability of leaders to coordinate decisions concerning
Europe is detrimental to public perceptions of confidence, which is perhaps a product of
leaders’ unwillingness to test the documented public opposition to the European project.
Even with all of the recent fluctuation of elite sentiments towards Europe, it
seems as though the British public has rarely been so ambiguous on the matter. Social
scholars have recognized that the sense of exceptionalism and skepticism that marked
traditional British imperialism has certainly made some degree of transition into modem
attitudes. Even at the beginning of 2002, after the introduction of the emo to the
European public. Professor John Curtice from Strathclyde has even gone so far as to say
that Britons still retain an “us versus them” attitude when it comes to the continent. He
went further to say that “very few people in Britain think of themselves as Europeans.”^
This was an important observation so early in the introduction of the hard common
currency because several key government officials have hoped that a tangible common
currency might quell the fears of the public. By the end of 2001, a poll conducted by The
Baker, David. 2001;p278
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Guardian showed that British public support for the euro rose slightly to 31 percent, with

58 percent still opposed.^ Some Cabinet Ministers, such as Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
immediately jumped on these results to show enthusiasm for the opposition gap falling to
within 27 percentage points. However, such a shift (even as minute as it may seem) has
not been uncommon in Britain. Just before the euro was introduced at the initial phases
in 1999, support rose to 30 percent, cutting the discrepancy to within 24 percentage
points. However, if this initial period of increased support brings any excitement to
government Europhiles, they should also consider that by the end of 1999 British support
fell back to hostile levels; and moreover, straightforward opposition has risen by several
points since.^
Therefore, any shift in support has served to raise the hopes of pro-Eiuopean
ministers, and then have them dashed by a recession to steady opposition. This would
seem to reflect the public’s consideration of issues previously discussed in this paper.
Therefore, while it has been perceived in the past that the public would generally follow a
well-coordinated leadership, in the past couple of decades it has seemed as though this
was perhaps too optimistically assmned. Previous considerations for British tensions
with the continent have rested upon deep-seated factors, yet both parties have straddled
the line between support and opposition by changing positions on the issue over the
years. As recently as 1983, the currently Euro-enthusiastic Labour Party supported
unconditional withdraw from the European Community. Also, was it not Margaret
Thatcher, now the epitome of Euroscepticism, that greatly backed the Single European

^ Smith, David. “Is Britain Falling for Europe’s Charms?” The Sunday Times (London). January 13, 2002
® Hanes, Tim. “The Single Currency Will Not Convert Many.” The Times (London). December 20, 2001
’ Ibid
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Act at the onset of her tenure as Prime Minister? Therefore, the underlying factors have
not changed, but it seems as though the public has a better grasp of this over their wise
leaders.
The Conservatives found this out perhaps after it was too late to salvage their
hopes for regaining public trust. Building up to the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1991,
there was a rise in support for British membership in the European Community, which
more recent numbers would tell us was the result of this now emerging trend following a
perceived increase in relations with the continent. In other words, the context of this
increase in support was perhaps due to both the anticipation of Maastricht and
involvement in the ERM. However, the ERM crisis and Britain’s eventual ejection from
it proved detrimental to confidence in the Conservatives as well as support for further
involvement with the continent.^ Using British Election Panel Studies from 1992 to 1996
we can see that while the number of proponents of integration stayed at roughly the same
lower levels, support for an increased protection of national sovereignty and diminished
relationship with Europe rose significantly. By 1996, the mean self-placement of
respondents on the scale ranging from complete unification with Europe and absolute
protection of independence had shifted significantly towards the withdraw end.^ It
should also be noted that the public’s perceptions of how the parties stood on the issues
stayed roughly the same for Conservatives and shifted more to the integrationist end of
the spectrum for the Labour Party. This is an interesting fact from which we can uncover
that even among supporters of Labour, the more pro-European of the parties, the

Evans, Geoffery. 1998:p574
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tendency was towards opposition to Europe.Therefore, we can see that public opinion
played a major role in this period, much of which rested on the ERM crisis and further
integration by way of Maastricht. Whereas the Tories had what could be termed an
electoral asset in the form of vast public opposition to integration and public perception
that it was the more anti-European of the parties, it was squandered as divisions in the
party deepened and confidence levels fell. Furthermore, the divisions in the party that
allowed in-fighting to stifle a coordinated position on Europe one way or the other, kept
public perception of the Tories position on integration much the same. This is all while
the public’s own attitudes became more adversarial, so even Conservatives became
alienated from actual public sentiments.
The impact that European integration had on the public’s perception of
Conservative competency cannot be underestimated. The failure of Britain’s attempt to
join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) resulting in its embarrassing forced exit in
1992 exacerbated existing divisions within the party. Furthermore, public opinion played
the role of a double-edged sword by also reflecting a lack of confidence in their ability to
govern. Therefore, even as far back as Black Wednesday, the Tories were in trouble by
way of public opinion, which simply got the ball rolling towards their enormous defeat in
the 1997 election.

Taking this into consideration, even with all of his Europhilia, Tony

Blair perhaps has his predecessors’ fate on his mind. It is now apparent that the public as
expressed wide majority opposition to European integration, and at the same time made
an embarrassing example of a Conservative Party that was imable to coordinate even a

Evans, Geoffery. 1998:p579
" lbid:p590
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strongly-backed Euroscepticism. Thus, the double-edged sword of public opinion will
now burdens the Labour government, perhaps more so than it did the Conservatives.'^
This is becoming more apparent as Prime Minister Blair tries to clean up the
tarnished reputation of Britain in Europe. While he is driven to end British ambivalence
towards the continent, the ambivalence seems to have turned to uncertainty at home.
With the state of domestic affairs such as health care and education in their current
decrepit states, and with a row emerging between Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor of
the Exchequer Gordon Brown, an uncoordinated effort might not serve Europhiles well.
If the competency of Tories was seen as faltering during the ERM debacle, then any
neglect of domestic issues could affect the public’s perception of Labour, despite large
electoral victories.
The results from the European Commission’s Continuous Tracking Survey (CTS)
have shown that British opposition to the European project (the full integration
proceedings) does not merely rest on the success of EMU or on perceived victories at the
most recent intergovernmental conference.*^ This is to be expected considering the
aforementioned tendency for support to wax in minute, short-lived bursts only to then
ultimately wane. Thus, the public has assumed the critical role of shaping policy stances
on Europe, considering its ability through opinion polls and elections to change the tide
of both parties. Christopher Anderson, in one of his studies on public opinion towards
European integration, found that a lack of education about the EU typically fostered
opposition to the integration proceedings.*"* However, from a Continuous Tracking

Evans, Geoffery. 1998:p590
Conducted by the European Commission’s Public Opinion Surveys and Research Unit
Anderson, Christopher. “When in Doubt, Use Proxies;
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Survey conducted at the end of 1997, found that Britons’ feelings about their knowledge
of the European Union were above the EU average.'^ While the number of Britons that
felt this was only at 40 percent, this must be taken alongside the fact that only Germany
and Luxembourg had a majority of the population, albeit slim majorities of 59 and 51
percent respectively, feel as though they were well-educated about the EU.'^ Therefore,
opposition in the British case carmot be fully attributed to the lack of education on the EU
and its institution. In fact, a general apathy towards the institutions of Europe seems to
exist alongside even a heightened education. If Anderson’s findings were completely
accurate, the opposite would be trae, and Britain would tend to exhibit greater support.
Surprisingly however, the CTS given at the end of 1997 found that some of the
lowest levels of interest in the functions of the European Union exist in Britain.
Generally, only about 50 percent of Britons expressed interest in learning more about
European institutions, treaties, the common currency or the aims and objectives of the
integration project as a whole.Therefore, public opinion seems to reflect an interesting
paradox in that their knowledge is above European-wide levels, but interest in the
continent seems to mn at about 20 percent below other member-states. This paradox has
been a large obstacle for leaders to negotiate because on this matter it seems has become
increasingly apparent that the public now takes a directive role on these issues.'^ Also, it
seems as though the public has set this paradox on an interesting balance by way of
obtaining just enough education to know that it does not support European integration nor
does it find interest in it. Recent Eurobarometer numbers find that only 33 percent of
Europinion, special report of Continuous Tracking Survey results following the Amsterdam IGC, 1997
Europinion, 1997
Europinion, Number 13, November 1997
Evans, Geoffery. 1998:p574
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Britons believe membership in the EU to be a “good thing,” and 36 percent see benefit in
membership.
With this said, it seems as though it is the British public that must now occupy
Blair’s attention if he is going to change their minds on Europe. However, because of the
importance of public opinion and because of the directive mode that it now seems to
serve, Blair seems to be avoiding the issue domestically. One telltale sign of this
reticence by Blair to commit fully is that of more than half a dozen key speeches on the
integration process only one has been done within Britain.*^ He is obviously considering
the daunting and perhaps detrimental task that comes with selling an idea that has for so
long sparked adamant opposition in Britain. But, Blair must also consider that
convincing the continent of Britain’s willingness to cooperate is not nearly as much a
factor as convincing Britain of Europe’s benefits. In the campaign preceding Blair’s
second term in 2001, the Labour Party adopted slogans such as “The Work Goes On,”
which seem to imply broad idyllic goals and promises.

90

The Prime Minister has to be careful with such rhetoric though. If it is confidence
in the government that will ultimately decide electoral fates, then Blair might be able to
win elections with such grandeur but that is perhaps where this rhetoric ceases to satisfy
the British public. Just as with the five economic “tests,” which are Blair’s pragmatic
steps towards Europe, such talk of a better Britain remains politically subjective
considering the crumbling state of Britain’s healthcare, education and transportation
systems. Britain still spends the least amount on healthcare than any other industrialized

Stephens, Philip. 2001:p74
“The End of the Beginning? Tony Blair Wants Labour to Rule Britain for a Generation. Winning the
Election is the Least of His Problems.” Time International. June 11, 2001 :p34
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nation; and, railways and roads are in deplorable conditions, even after billions of pounds
worth of repairs. This is all aside from the fact that the future does not look promising
for the British as its 16 to 25 year-old demographic remains behind every Western
European country (except Ireland) in reading ability.^ ^
With all of this facing the British domestic scene, Blair would seem to be treading
on dangerous ground if he continues to turn attention towards the continent. Perhaps due
to these internal woes, a recent NOP survey commissioned by the pro-integration Britain
in Europe group showed that 67 percent of the public wants a referendum on the euro
before the next general election. In this same poll, a strong opposition at 49 percent was
even shown to exist for joining the common currency in the event of passing the
economic tests.

First and foremost, this is a telling sign that want much of the European

issue to be solved as quickly as possible, believing that joining the common currency is
the most tangible indicator of British attitudes. However, the 49 percent that would
oppose joining the euro even if these criteria were met is reflective of the overall British
tendency towards opposition. Furthermore, what it shows Tony Blair is that there is still
a large contingent in Britain that refuses to be convinced by broad promises and spin
artist-like rhetoric that it will take to convince the public on the government’s subjective
decisions on these tests. It would seem that rather than taking a positive stand on
entrance into EMU, the government is still holding onto the question of “if ’ Britain is

“The End of the Beginning?..Time International. June 11, 2001 :p35
“67 % of Public Want Euro Poll.” Guardian Unlimited. February 27, 2002.
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/polls/story
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able to join. Thus, it appears to be shouting about Britain forging new bonds with the
continent while at the same time staying relatively quiet in its actions.^^
This is perhaps the point from which the current Labour government has the
possibility of pursuing much the same fate as the Tories. First and foremost, Britain has
had some very deep-seated problems in these aforementioned domestic areas, including
the economy that could become troublesome for the current government. As was
mentioned in previous sections, Blair has tried to project a Britain with unemployment,
inflation and interest rates all at striking lows. However, the fact of the matter still
remains that the British infrastmcture is crumbling in concerning proportions.^'*
Therefore, if he fails to look at these issues before he tries to include his healthy image of
Britain into the continent, he could be overlooking crucial issues that could prove
detrimental not only to the public’s confidence levels, but also to Britain’s current
strengths. In other words, what the public most likely realizes is that Britain may stand at
a high point in relation to the continent now, but such fundamental domestic issues could
facilitate the downfall of this.
What Conservatives discovered was that holding the same line as the public on
the European issues could not silence discontent if their own competency was perceived
as waning. Thus, while Blair might have a currently healthy Britain on his side, this will
not simply change the precedence of Euroscepticism. If he continues to project a strong
London to his European colleagues while not dealing with domestic problems and selling
integration at home, he will perhaps be subject to an even further distancing than that
experienced by Conservatives. Also, divisions that have previously emerged in the
23
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Labour strategy towards Europe could prove to be similar as well. Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown made it apparent in a statement even as early as October 1997
that he intended the current decisions about EMU to rest solely on national interest.
Therefore, the answers to the “tests” still remain subjective but Brown has made it clear
that he will probably view it more passively on economic terms and exercise a veto in
any policy proposals. However, an enthusiastic Blair would still like to make Britain’s
case in an active manner. Thus, the line between making the issue either political or
economic is a blurry one. A tension within the Labour Party causing a disjointed policy
strategy towards Europe. Conservatives found a disconnected party to be fatal to public
confidence levels, and the Labour Party could run into the same troubles. To place this
tension atop an underlying public hostility towards the continent, the current Labour
government might have to initiate a referendum on EMU as a final vote of confidence.

24
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Conclusion

Few would doubt that the efforts of European nations to “pool” their interests
together in the sake of a lasting peace and security have been widely successful thus far.
The simple fact that mid-twentieth century European leaders saw it necessary to make
steps towards some sort of alliance rather than falling back into the cleavages that had
caused so much bloodshed and distrust in the past was a crucial sign that a European
community could prosper. However, the deep-seated urgency that the continent felt after
the Second World War was not shared by all of the current members of the modem
European Union, so we can assume that the project of deeper and wider integration has
evolved over the last five decades into a body that is not only precautionary but also
assertive in building an influential role on the global stage. This is largely due to the
underlying political scope of integration, which seems to bother Britain the most.
This may seem more like paranoia on the part of Euroskeptics because with the European
Coal and Steel Community and moving right up into the current Economic and Monetary
Union project, European integration has generally looked more economic in practice. On
the other hand, leaders from the Franco-German core of Europe have numerous times
expressed their desires for a closer political union, with both Jean Monnet, the father of
the modem European Union, and the once adamantly pro-European German Chancellor,
Helmut Kohl, both striving for the “ever closer Union.” And, while Britain’s neo-liberal
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economic model and a more “social Europe” now at conflicting points in the business
cycle, so too is a unitary system incongruous with a quasi-federal European structure. It
is apparent that more federal models of certain member-states have and will continue to
assimilate European authority over their own national governments in some areas. Some
might argue that even a unitary state such as France was able to not only assimilate the
European power stmcture but also shape it in many instances. However, Britain uses its
power structure in a more complex manner combining with it the ultimate authority of
Parliament, which France does not have.
With appeals to protecting a national identity that has both a prominence of the
notions of sovereignty as well as historical aversions to Europe, some Europhiles have
claimed that Britain is simply grasping on to largely antiquated attitudes. What with the
fall of the empire and the failure to find a new role, it seems as though it would be time
for the British to take the steps towards a “modernized” conception of Britishness.
Europhiles make a good case for this in the face of growing integration across many
sectors, not just in Europe.
However, the current efforts to modernize of Tony Blair and the new Labour,
which are largely based on devolution and a shiny, new cool Britannia, seem superficial
at best. History has shown that when confronted with pressing foreign policy pressures
Britain seems to consolidate national identity under a broader umbrella. The power
structure in Britain affords Parliament absolute sovereignty in political matters, and
furthermore it has been in the best interest of Westminster to keep the United Kingdom as
a whole together. Thus, devolution in this case is perhaps a modernizing element to the
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Third Way reconsideration of representation, but it hardly upends the overall unitary
character of Britain and the notion of parliamentary sovereignty.
Instead, what we have seen is that should the opportunity arise for the four nations
of the United Kingdom (Wales, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland) to assert
independent identities themselves, it is not entirely unlikely for a shift of identity
projections, especially abroad, to occur back to the center. In other words, the
importance that parliamentary sovereignty plays in British national identity has also
created an historical assertion of English traditions. While this English occupation of
national sentiments has not required a hegemonic dilution of what it means to be Welsh,
Scottish or Irish, it has been a primary factor in overall British feelings abroad. It is from
this that we arrive at the feelings of moral authority, of ex-empire, and of hostilities
towards the rest of Europe.
However, if the British incompatibility with European integration was to lie in
these defining national characteristics, then Prime Minister Blair’s wishes for British
Europhilia might not be far off. The tendency for Britain to shun or even despise the
continent and turn its attention to an open seas policy would be a relic of the past. If
Britain comes to the conclusion that it is no longer an imperial power with the luxury of
averting its attention from potential allies, then a simple change in rhetoric would bridge
the gap of ambivalence. The interconnectedness of parliamentary sovereignty and ties to
democratic governance go deeper than a change of positions from the Prime Minister’s
office. There is a distinct democratic deficit that remains in the European Union that is
going to be hard for even the most pro-European leader to reconcile with the British
public. Subsequently, the projections of a friendlier Britain abroad has not been able to
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quell Prime Minister Blair’s fears of a wide scale public backlash. Public opinion
towards the common currency and towards the European Union as a whole remains
vastly unsympathetic to integration. Leaders then run into the problem of negotiating a
public that is both vehemently skeptical of integration and unforgiving of a leadership
unable to establish a coherent stance. The Conservatives found that Europe has the
power to divide across traditional left-right distinctions, preventing them from
esiablishing even a united Euroskepticism and making them appear incompetent to
govern.
Therefore, public opinion may be one of the most critical domestic factors in
Britain’s hostility towards European integration, and Tony Blair is currently finding this
out. He has made headway with his five “tests” for participation in the euro, but the
answers to them remain subjective. However, the single currency is simply one of the
current highly publicized issues and does not encompass deeper questions. There is also
the question of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) that will soon come to the forefront as
European Union enlargement talks increase. With this issue, Britain has another fork in
the road ahead of it. If it is to retain a high degree of autonomy it has to consider whether
or not it wants to retain the right of the national veto in the Council of Ministers or
whether it wants to opt for more QMV based in the assumption that this will further its
ability to opt-out of several controversial initiatives.' Regardless of what British leaders
opt to do however will not rectify the fundamental aversions to integration, it will simply
serve to expose them with either a veto or an opt-out.

' “Britain and Europe: Escalating Hostilities.” The Economist (US). October 23, 1999:p64
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This does not bode well for a current Prime Minister that would like to put Britain
at the helm of further European Union development. It seems as though Blair would like
to avoid these fundamental questions by appealing to the need for Britain to parallel the
rest of Europe for fear of falling further behind. He would like to incorporate the ideas of
the “inevitability” of further integration and shun terms such as the “isolation” of Britain.
However, Blair seems to be confused in the realities of Britain’s necessity to harmonize
and shape the continent. Europhiles will say that Britain is going to be shaped by the
European Union, whether it is a leader or an awkward partner. If this is to be the case,
then Britain might as well do all in its power to lead this influence. However, in the
current global political and economic climate, Britain is shaped by the world around it,
not just Europe. In cases such as the economic pressures of the European Central Bank it
is perhaps even more of an exaggerated outlook to think that Britain will be under the
complete control of a supranational body, even as a dissenting party.^ These arguments
seem to confuse the idea of sovereignty with complete autonomy, which no modem state
possesses.^
Prime Minister Blair wants to project Britain’s current economic highs as
evidence of the superiority of British models and of Britain’s new modem identity.
However, on the issues of “isolation” and “inevitability” he will mn into obstacles based
on the current success. The longer that Britain chooses to contend integration efforts, the
less weight that inevitability carries. Furthermore, with Britain thriving as an outsider in
some key European projects the danger of isolation becomes diluted. Because of this, he
will ultimately be forced to turn all of his positive spins on Europe into the same political
^Rachman, Gideon. 1998. “Britain’ European Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly. v21 n3:pl75

75

questions that remain below the surface. He has chosen to promote British appeals to
liberal economics and closing the democratic deficit in Europe. He has chosen to
promote Britain in Europe in an effort to allow Britain to lead the next generation of
integration. However, he is having an easier time selling this to his European colleagues.
The troubles in doing this at home still remain because even the most pro-European “wait
and see policy will not solve the underlying incompatibilities between Britain and the
European Union.

The Economy Outside the Euro.” The Economist (US). January 9, 1999;p5 ]
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